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Abstract—One single error can result in a total compromise of
all security in today’s large, monolithic software. Partitioning of
software can help simplify code-review and verification, whereas
isolated execution of software-components limits the impact of
incorrect implementations.
However, existing application partitioning techniques are too
expensive, too imprecise, or involve unsafe manual steps. An
automatic, yet safe, approach to dissect security protocols into
component-based systems is not available.
We present a method and toolset to automatically segregate
security related software into an indefinite number of partitions,
based on the security guarantees required by the deployed crypto-
graphic building blocks. As partitioning imposes communication
overhead, we offer a range of sound performance optimizations.
Furthermore, by applying our approach to the secure
messaging protocol OTR, we demonstrate its applicability and
achieve a significant reduction of the trusted computing base.
Compared to a monolithic implementation, only 29% of the
partitioned protocol requires confidentiality guarantees with a
process overhead comparable to common sandboxing techniques.
Keywords. Application partitioning, security protocols, trusted
computing base
I. INTRODUCTION
Mass surveillance is reality today. It is technically possible
to record the Internet traffic of a whole country [14] or
monitor complete Internet exchange points in real time [24].
Consequently, software vendors realized that encryption is key
to protect the sensitive information of their customers. Strong
security protocols gradually became a default [29], [3], [23],
some of the protocols even got formally verified [6], [11], [21],
which means that it can only be broken if an assumption is
invalidated, or a mathematically hard problem is solved.
In practice, security protocols are always embedded into a very
complex software system. Depending on their realization, they
rely on operating system services, application runtimes or web
browsers. If an attacker exploits a vulnerability in any of these
dependencies, security protocols can be broken or bypassed,
even when formally verified.
To achieve correctness, we must ensure an error-free imple-
mentation of the security protocol and all its dependencies.
However, the size of those software dependencies typically
is in the range of some million lines of code. This, by far,
exceeds the limits of formal verification and makes thorough
manual review infeasible.
To enable complete verification, the fact that only small parts
of a security protocol implementation are security critical
can be leveraged. If software is segregated into multiple
isolated components which interact only through well-defined
interfaces, verification can be done on a per-component basis.
While the small critical components are analyzed indepen-
dently with manageable effort, large uncritical components can
be ignored completely.
Component-based architectures realize this concept using for
example a microkernel. This small software isolates com-
ponents and allows access to resources and communication
channels only if permitted explicitly. This default-deny policy
and the limited functionality of the microkernel dramatically
reduced the trusted computing base (TCB), i.e. the code that
has to be correct to fulfill the objective of a security protocol.
While the component-based approach has been studied exten-
sively in the past, its application to security protocol imple-
mentations poses a number of open problems: (a) Determining
security critical and uncritical components systematically with
minimum manual intervention and identifying data-flows be-
tween them is complex and error-prone. (b) Minimizing the
TCBs of the resulting component-based system is unsolved.
(c) There are no methods that guarantee the overall security of
componentized implementations. (d) No systematic approach
for reducing the introduced overhead is available.
To solve these problems, we model security protocol imple-
mentations as a graph of connected primitives annotated with
predicates representing the required security guarantees. A
constraint data flow analysis assigns valid guarantees to the
model using an SMT solver. In a subsequent partitioning step,
primitives with compatible guarantees are combined into com-
ponents to optimize performance. The security-performance
trade-off made during partitioning is configurable.
Our contribution
To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to present an
automatic, yet sound partitioning algorithm that can minimize
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2the required guarantees and can be tweaked regarding its
security-performance trade-off. Our main contributions in the
field of software partitioning are:
• a methodology for predicate-based data-flow analysis for
assigning security guarantees
• combination of benefits from data-flow analysis and man-
ual decomposition
• trade-off between security and performance using opti-
mization criteria.
Further results, like the component-based, minimal-TCB im-
plementation of the OTR messaging protocol, as well as
the combination of predicate logic and software-partitioning
together with a set of predicate templates for common security-
primitives is of independent interest.
Section II discusses related work and distinguishes our method
from existing approaches. Subsequently we present our ap-
proach, introduce necessary building blocks and demonstrate
it’s applicability using two well-known examples in Sec-
tion III. We scale our method to larger protocols using our
automated toolkit described in Section IV. Section V puts our
results into context regarding the related work and discusses
future research directions. A summary concludes our work in
Section VI.
II. RELATED WORK
Our analysis relates to many well established research areas.
We classify previous results into a) protocol proofs for cryp-
tographic protocols based on presumably hard mathematical
problem, b) software verification to show the correctness of
an implementation, c) decomposition mechanisms for parti-
tioning software into multiple components, and d) isolation
mechanisms for securely executing mutually distrusted pro-
cesses. In the following paragraphs we position the proposed
analysis along these classes, clarify our contribution, highlight
important results over previous works and remove ambiguity.
a) Protocol proofs: Some cryptographic protocols can be
proven to be secure as long as a hard mathematical problems
cannot be solved and the assumptions are not invalidated. As
such, the well known textbook Diffie-Hellman key agreement
protocol is secure as long as the discrete logarithm problem
can not be solved easily, or the assumption that the adversary
can not intercept and modify messages between both partici-
pating parties is invalidated. Relying on proven cryptographic
protocols guarantees that the cryptographic building blocks are
not easily attackable. Security does, however, still depend on
a correct software implementation of the proven protocol. We
use these results to systematically eliminate attacks on the
theoretical basis of secure systems.
b) Software verification: Architecing secure software systems
requires the correct implementation of software components.
To find programming mistakes and software errors, methods
for software verification were developed. Applying these to
software implementations guarantees the absence of runtime
errors, otherwise potentially nullifying the proven security
properties. A formally verified reference implementation of the
Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol is presented in [6].
The authors show confidentiality and integrity of data sent over
the protocol.
Domain specific languages can be used for writing crypto-
graphic protocol code that can be checked afterwards. Pro-
Script [22] is such an example that can be executed within
JavaScript programs and used for symbolic analysis. The
authors verify a variant of the Signal Protocol for secure
messaging.
Even though the software implementing a cryptographic proto-
col is checked, errors are likely to be found in the surrounding
runtimes, libraries and operating systems required to run the
verified cryptographic protocol code. Verified implementations
may serve as a correct input model for our approach, but do
not solve the problem to find small trusted computing bases.
c) Decomposition mechanisms: As verified software for
proven cryptographic protocols is still vulnerable just by
its huge trusted computing bases, isolated execution of de-
composed software was proposed. There exist two main ap-
proaches for software decomposition in the relevant litera-
ture: (1) manual decomposition and (2) dataflow analysis.
We directly enhance the state-of-the-art by proposing a new
mechanism to deduce components from existing software in
a semiautomatic way. Security and soundness properties are
composable and can be combined more easily than with any
of the previously proposed methods.
(1) Manual decomposition of cryptographic protocols into
trusted and untrusted components running on a microkernel
have been done for IPsec [18] and IKE [30], [10], which
required a lot of manual work and expert knowledge. Even
though the results likely improve security, no guarantees
exist that the partitioning was done correctly. For every new
protocol or major software update, the partitioning must be
redone.
(2) Dataflow analysis has been proposed to eliminate most
of the manual effort. Several tools were developed to assist
and partially automate program partitioning. PrivTrans [8]
performs static analysis of source code to partition programs
into core functionality and a monitor. ProgramCutter [36]
automatically splits a program based on traces collected for
multiple program runs. The authors of [28] performed taint
analysis on Android applications to move critical portions into
an isolated trusted execution environment. None of the tools
exploit specifics of cryptographic operations. This results in an
unnecessarily large TCB or requires unsafe manual removal of
taints using expert knowledge.
d) Isolation mechanisms: Execution of components has
strong isolation requirements, which can be met using different
techniques. Hardware extensions have been introduced for
3isolating memory accesses [35], [25], by creating trusted
execution environments [12], [4] and encrypting memory [19].
Microkernels [20], [15], micro hypervisors [32] and separation
kernels [9] realize isolation by means of a trusted software
layer, monolithic operating systems have been extended to
enhance process isolation [34], [31], [1]. We assume com-
ponent isolation and controlled interaction, but do not rely on
any particular technology. These mechanisms can be used as
building blocks for fulfilling our requirements.
Restricting privileges of software regarding their ability to
perform system calls as can be found in the principle of least
privileges literature is not applicable [17]. These results always
assume a monolithic system that inherently comes with large
trusted computing bases, contradicting our goal of having a
small TCB that can be checked for correctness.
III. DESIGN
In this section we introduce our methodology to partition a
given software into components in a structured way. It is a
combination of manual decomposition and dataflow analysis
based on predicate logic. We naturally combine the benefits of
both methods, namely we inherit the specificity of manual de-
composition and the efficiency of dataflow analysis. However,
instead of analyzing the software implementation directly, we
create an annotated data flow representation termed model as
basis for all further analysis. As a last step we group together
parts of the model with similar properties into partitions.
Accordingly, there are four main steps involved to apply our
methodology.
A. Generate an abstract model of the software
B. Annotate parts of it with predicates
C. Perform a constraint dataflow analysis
D. Run an adaptive partitioning algorithm
The following sections introduce and describe the involved
steps in more detail.
A. Model
A software implementation of a security protocol inherently
requires guarantees from its environment. However, as stated
in the previous sections, not all parts of the software require the
same guarantees. To calculate the actually required guarantees
for any part of the software we model it as a graph of
interconnected primitives. All primitives have a set of input
and output ports with associated guarantees. These guarantees
are represented using variables in a predicate.
Some primitives might have different guarantee requirements
on its input and output ports. For example, a symmetric
encryption algorithm could have the requirement to guarantee
confidentiality on its input ports (data and key), while not
requiring confidentiality on its output. To capture such a
relation, predicates are assigned to primitives describing the
relation of guarantees between ports of a primitive and security
goals.
Initially, only a few model variables are assigned manually
to capture the assumptions of the environment. To derive the
required guarantees for all parts of the model, a system of
equations consisting of all predicates needs to be solved. If a
solution is found, then the assigned variable values represent
the necessary guarantees of the protocol.
As a next step, primitives that require similar guarantees are
identified. The identified primitives may then be realized as
an isolated component with well-defined interfaces.
1) Primitives and channels: A primitive is a finite state
machine reacting to stimuli from the environment or from
other primitives. Stimuli are asynchronous messages received
through the input ports of a primitive. It may send messages
through its output ports. Primitives are loosely coupled and
make no assumptions about connected primitives.
The Env primitive is special, as it denotes the boundary of
our model. Messages received by this primitive from the
environment are forwarded to its output port. Messages sent to
its input port are forwarded to the environment, respectively.
A networking component with an integrated TCP/IP stack can
for example be represented as an Env primitive.
Prim
Input1
Input2
Output1
Figure 1: Example: Instance of primitive Prim with two input
ports Input1 and Input2 and one output port Output.
Primitives are templates denoting a type of a node within the
protocol model. They carry specific semantics, input ports and
output ports. To realize a protocol, primitives are instantiated
and their ports are connected to other instances through
channels to form a graph. While instances are unique, the
same primitive might be instantiated to multiple instances. A
channel is a connection between exactly one output port of an
instance to exactly one input port of another instance.
B. Predicates
An instance of a symmetric decryption primitive transforms
ciphertext into plaintext using a secret key. Intuitively, no con-
fidentiality needs to be guaranteed for the original ciphertext
when sent to the decryption primitive, as confidentiality is
achieved by means of cryptography. But once the data has
been decrypted and is sent to an output port, confidentiality is
4Enc ctr
Plaintext (CiphertextI → PlaintextI )
Key (KeyI ∧ KeyC )
CiphertextCtr (CtrI )
Figure 2: Counter-mode encryption primitive with predicates
determining port guarantees
Renc ctr =
−−−−−−−→
CiphertextI → PlaintextI (1)
∧KeyI ∧KeyC (2)
∧ CtrI (3)
Figure 3: Predicate determining guarantees for the counter-
mode encryption primitive
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Figure 4: DH key exchange before partitioning. Unknown:
white, No guarantees: gray/continuous, Confidentiality: red/-
dashed, Integrity: blue/dotted, Both: purple/dot-dashed
no longer achieved by cryptography, but must be guaranteed by
the channel connected to the output port and by the receiving
instance.
For a hypothetical primitive PPrim (Figure 1) with input ports
Input1 and Input2 and an output port
−−−−→
Output , a predicate
R, representing required guarantees, is expressed as RPrim =
Input1I ∧ Input2 C ∧
−−−−→
OutputI . This states, that the primitive
Prim assumes that the input channel connected to Input1
guarantees integrity (denoted by the I in the subscript). For the
Const:
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Key x
DHpub:
gixi mod m
Transform:
Branch x
l
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P4
Figure 5: DH key exchange after partitioning. Unknown: white,
No guarantees: gray/continuous, Confidentiality: red/dashed,
Integrity: blue/dotted, Both: purple/dot-dashed
respective channel of Input2 , confidentiality (C) is assumed.
Furthermore, it assumes that the channel associated with the
output port
−−−−→
Output (marked by an arrow symbol) guarantees
integrity.
Channels must provide at least the guarantees required by
the ports they connect. This implies that for two instances
A and B where A’s output port
−−→
Out is connected to B’s
input port In through a channel Chan the predicate RChan =−→
OutI ⇔ InI ∧ −→OutC ⇔ InC holds. For ease of understanding,
channel predicates are not given explicitly, but represented
by identical port names of connected ports throughout the
remaining document.
C. Dataflow analysis
Using the introduced building blocks, a simple example for
counter-mode encryption is evaluated as well as a text-book
Diffie-Hellman key agreement protocol.
1) Simple encryption: The counter mode encryption primitive
Enc ctr in Figure 3 has three input ports: Plaintext , Key and
Ctr for receiving plaintext, key and an initial counter, respec-
tively. The result of the encryption is sent to the
−−−−−−−→
Ciphertext
port.
The guarantees it requires from its runtime environment to ful-
fill its security objective are defined in Figure 3: (1) If integrity
is required for
−−−−−−−→
Ciphertext then integrity is also required for
5the plaintext input port, as an attacker controlling the plaintext
can influence the ciphertext. Counter mode encryption does
not achieve integrity cryptographically, hence, integrity for the
ciphertext is only achieved by guaranteeing integrity for the
plaintext. (2) Integrity and confidentiality of the encryption
key must always be guaranteed or an attacker could learn or
choose the key. (3) The integrity of the counter is essential
to counter mode, as using the same key/counter combination
twice is fatal.
2) Diffie-Hellman: We use the Diffie-Hellman key agreement
as a more sophisticated example (Figure 4). Two connections
to the environment exist in this model: Keystore for holding
keys and Network for sending and receiving messages over
an untrusted channel. As outlined in Section III-A we for-
malize the assumptions about the environment in (4) and (5).
For brevity, we leave out channel predicates and relieve the
Keystore from the necessary integrity assumption.
γi
xi
C ≡ False ∧ γixiI ≡ False (4)
γr
yr
C ≡ False ∧ γryrI ≡ False (5)
giI ∧miI ∧ grI ∧mrI (6)
xrC ∧ xrI ∧ xiC ∧ xiI ∧ sC (7)
xC ∧ lI (8)
sI → (gyI ∧ grI ∧mrI ∧ xrI) (9)
Figure 6: Assumptions for the environment and predicates for
cryptographic elements
mC → (miC ∧mrC) (10)
miI ∨mrI → mI (11)
gC → (giC ∧ grC) (12)
giI ∨ grI → gI (13)
γ
x
I → gxI (14)
xC → (xiC ∧ xrC) (15)
xiI ∨ xrI → xI (16)
gr
yr
I → γryrI (17)
γr
yr
C → gryrC (18)
γi
xi
I → gixiI (19)
gi
xi
C → γixiC (20)
Figure 7: Predicates for Transform primitives used in Diffie-
Hellman model
The core of Diffie-Hellman is the DHpub primitive calculating
gx mod m and the DHsec primitive calculating the shared
secret s = gyx mod m. The value for the secret key x is
created by a random number generator RNG. Fixed values
like the length of x or the values for g and m originate from
Const primitives. Encoding and branching of data to several
primitives is done by Transform.
We can derive the complete guarantees for the model given
in Figure 4 by using the guarantees of the environment and a
couple of generic primitive predicates. The DHpub and DHsec
primitives require integrity for their parameters and secret key,
so that an attacker cannot choose an own value (6). The secret
key x for both primitives must be confidential, just like the
resulting key s (7).
sI , g
y
I , lC, gC,mC, g
x
C ← False (21)
19, 4 : g
x
I ≡ False (22)
18, 5 : g
y
C ≡ False (23)
7, 8, 15 : xiC ≡ True, xiI ≡ True (24)
6 : miI ≡ True, giI ≡ True (25)
6 : mrI ≡ True, grI ≡ True (26)
7 : xrC ≡ True, xrI ≡ True (27)
7 : sC ≡ True (28)
11, 25, 26 : mI ≡ True (29)
13, 25, 26 : gI ≡ True (30)
21, 10 : miC ≡ False,mrC ≡ False (31)
21, 12 : giC ≡ False, grC ≡ False (32)
8 : xC ≡ True (33)
16, 24, 27 : xI ≡ True (34)
Figure 8: Solution for the above Diffie-Hellman model
The result x of RNG must have confidentiality guaranteed
and key length l is public, but it’s integrity must be protected
to prevent an attacker from choosing a too short key (8). We
over-approximate the relationship between inputs and outputs
of Transform: Whenever any input requires confidentiality, all
outputs require confidentiality. Whenever an output requires
integrity, all inputs must guarantee it. This implies the relevant
guarantees shown in Figure 7.
To minimize the requirements for the implementation, we set
variables lacking explicit guarantees to False (21). Together
with the predicates above, we can determine a valid assign-
ment for all variables in the model as shown in Figure 8 and
visualized in Figure 5.
As stated above, our model does not assume integrity for the
Keystore. This is a consequence of the Diffie-Hellman key
agreement scheme, which does not achieve integrity by cryp-
tographic means. If we had chosen the Keystore guarantees
realistically, our method would have yield a conflict between
the absence of integrity stated for the network environment
and the system of equations given by our model. Specifically
the assumption sI together with the predicates, (9), (17), (5)
result in the contradiction γryrI ∧ ¬γryrI .
D. Adaptive Partitioning
The naı¨ve transformation of our model into an implementation
would create a single component for every instance in the
model. As communication between components is expensive,
this results in a large communication overhead, compared
to a monolithic implementation. To reduce this overhead we
introduce an algorithm to trade-off communication cost against
TCB size. Instances with compatible guarantees can be merged
into a single component. Due to efficient communication
within a component, the total overhead is reduced. However,
merging instances into fewer, but larger components comes at
the cost of increasing the size of the TCB.
We instantiate three simple partitioning algorithms to demon-
6strate the described trade-off capabilities. One algorithm that
only merges identical guarantees and two that take the seman-
tics of the primitives into account. By adopting an appropriate
cost function, more powerful, adaptive partitioning schemes
can be realized.
Merge Basic The simplest approach is to put connected in-
stances with identical guarantees into the same partition.
The algorithm iterates over all instances in the model.
For each instance, it checks whether it was assigned
to a partition already. Otherwise, it assigns it to a new
partition. For each new partition it traverses all connected
components with the same guarantees and tries to assign
them to the newly generated partition.
Merge Const Additional to the basic partitioning scheme,
this algorithm merges all Const instances with their
connected partition if that partition provides sufficient
guarantees. This eliminates single instances of the Const
primitive representing an own partition as seen in P1 of
Figure 5. As constants are simple, merging them results
only in a minor increase of the TCB.
Merge Branch The third algorithm is similar to Merge Const
in that it joins Const primitives, as well as additional,
simple instances into the same partition. To define simple
instances an arbitrary metric can be used, for examples
the lines of code to implement an instance. If the metric
used relates to the TCB size, it can be argued that the
TCB is not increased significantly. As an example refer to
the merging of partitions P4 and P5 into P2 in Figure 5.
IV. APPLICATION OF OUR FRAMEWORK
As seen in the previous Diffie-Hellman example, the number
of predicates to be checked for a model quickly grows to an
unmanageable size. In the following section we describe our
automatic PrettyCat toolset for partitioning and asserting of
protocol models and apply it to the OTR protocol. It consists
of four main phases: Analysis, Assertion, Partitioning, and
Execution (cf. Figure 9). The last phase of the PrettyCat toolset
Execution is not part of our methodical framework as described
in Section III, but included to perform functional validation.
A. PrettyCat Toolset
In the analysis phase, model constraints are derived from
primitive predicates, channel predicates and the guarantees
assumed for the environment. The resulting constraint set
is passed to an SMT solver, e.g. Z3 [13], to find a valid
assignment for all guarantees. It may not be satisfiable, in
which case the solver may produce an unsatisfiability core.
If available, this minimum set of constraints that lead to the
contradiction is mapped to the graph by our tool. The conflict
can then be inspected visually and used to find conflicts in the
model or the assumptions.
The assertion phase checks assertions associated with the
model based on independent expert knowledge. Guarantees are
derived automatically in the partitioning phase, solely using
primitive predicates, channel predicates and assumption about
the environment. However, missing guarantees may render a
previously correct algorithm insecure. As assertions are not
used in partitioning, they serve as an independent sanity check
for predicates and assumptions.
In the partitioning phase, partitions are derived using the basic
recursive algorithm described in Section III-D. Optionally,
constants and branches are merged to reduce IPC overhead.
Lastly, models may be executed out of the PrettyCat toolset
directly in the execution phase. We provide a library of
primitives for HMAC, DSA, Diffie-Hellman and more. Con-
nections to the environment are realized using TCP/IP, files
or the console. Own implementations can be added easily by
implementing a Python class. Being solely a validation tool,
all primitives execute in the same Python process with no
isolation enforced.
B. Study: Off-the-record messaging
We applied our approach to the Off-the-Record Messaging
(OTR) protocol [7] for secure instant messaging. As the
Socialist Millionaire Protocol is optional for the security of
OTR, we leave this part out.
From the protocol specification we derived a component
model. OTR’s goal to serve as a plugin-solution for existing
messaging protocols, turned out to be helpful identifying the
Env primitives representing the boundaries of the model: User
Data, Keystore and Fingerprint. They all require confidential-
ity and integrity guarantees as they handle user message, long-
term keys or the identity of the remote party. The Network
environment used to interface OTR with the Internet has no
guarantees whatsoever.
The model for the full OTR protocol consists of 186 primitive
instances connected by 285 channels. Only the four instances
denoting the environment of the model are annotated explicitly
with guarantees. Based on that information our optimized
Merge Branch algorithm (cf. Section III-D) automatically
splits the protocol into the 7 partitions shown in Figure 10.
In a step independent of the model creation, we revisited the
OTR specification and augmented the model by 46 assertions
which are validated correct by the PrettyCat toolset. The
partitioned model runs against a minimal test client built with
the OTR reference implementation of the protocol authors [2].
We successfully negotiate keys and send messages between
both implementations.
V. DISCUSSION
To assess the quality of our approach, we need to consider the
overhead caused by additional inter-process communication,
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Figure 9: The four phases of the PrettyCat toolset
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Figure 10: Partitions automatically derived from the OTR
model (Integrity: blue/dotted, Confidentiality: red/dashed,
Both: purple/dot-dashed, No guarantees: gray/continuous)
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Figure 11: Process and IPC overhead in OTR
the partitioning introduced and the security advantage of
partitioning a protocol.
A. Overhead
In a partitioned protocol, security is improved by isolating
code with different security guarantees. That security gain
comes at an added cost of inter-process communication. Our
baseline is a monolithic implementation with one single pro-
cess and therefore efficient communication.
As shown in Figure 11, simply implementing every instance
within its own component (Merge none), expectedly leads to
a prohibitively large number of processes and inter-process
communication for our OTR model1. To reduce the overhead
we partition the model such that primitives with the same
guarantees are merged into a single component. That basic
partitioning schema Merge Basic reduces the required number
of processes by 87% and the amount of inter-process channels
by 62%. Performance optimizations can be applied to further
reduce the overhead. As such, very small primitives like
constants can be merged into adjacent components using
Merge Const. This further reduces processes and commu-
nication channels by 54% and 16%, respectively. Similarly,
Merge Branch merges even more primitives. This leads to the
architecture depicted in Figure 10 with the minimum number
of processes possible without significantly increasing the TCB.
A description of the partitioning schemes can be found in
Section III-D.
Partitioning software may significantly increases the total
number of processes, thus consuming additional system re-
sources. A large number of processes is for example used
to improve fault-isolation in web browsers, with acceptable
overhead [27]. Further overhead is imposed by additional inter-
process communication, which is performed very efficiently
on modern microkernels [32], typically orders of magnitude
faster than common cryptographic primitives.
B. Security gain
The security gain achieved by partitioning a security protocol
can be measured by the size of the resulting trusted computing
1In total, 182 processes with 285 inter-process channels would be needed
to implement the protocol.
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Guarantees Monolithic Partitioned Reduction
None - [7266] -
Integrity - 2645 -
Confidentiality + Integrity 10957 3155 29%
TCB 10957 5800 53%
Table I: Complexity of partitioned vs. monolithic OTR.
base. Monolithic software must guarantee confidentiality and
integrity for their whole implementation, as an error in a
part unrelated to the security protocol can completely defeat
security.
Our approach reduces the trusted computing base by assigning
parts of the protocol to components without security guaran-
tees. Those parts become untrusted and can be implemented in
the most convenient way. Additionally, we treat confidential-
ity and integrity independently, which results in components
where only integrity needs to be guaranteed. While this does
not change the size of the overall TCB, it does in fact simplify
assumptions for the respective components.
In the lack of a full component-based implementation, we
estimate the TCB size using the code in our model execution
framework. As it implements primitives as Python classes, we
chose a python OTR implementation to compare against.2 The
TCB calculation includes cryptographic and standard python
classes used by the implementations, but excludes the python
runtime an everything beneath. TCB size is represented by
measuring the source lines of code (SLOC3).
By partitioning the OTR protocol, we reduce the size of the
OTR-related TCB to 53% compared to a monolithic Python
implementation using the same cryptographic libraries. Our
approach of treating confidentiality and integrity indepen-
dently, specifically reduced the part of the TCB for which
confidentiality is to be guaranteed to only 29% of the original
size.
2https://github.com/python-otr/pure-python-otr
3generated using David A. Wheeler’s ’SLOCCount’
C. Future work
We automatically partition a security protocol, determine the
guarantees required for the partitions and derive a communi-
cation policy between them. The user of our PrettyCat toolset
still needs to provide the input model, which involves manual
work and presents an additional source of errors. Also, while
the result of our analysis is a machine-readable, partitioned
model, the transformation into a component-based system is
left as a manual step.
As suggested in Figure 12, we are going to extend our tools to
extract the input model from existing source code using data
flow analysis, e.g. FlowDroid [5]. Preliminary results suggest
that most primitives can be matched against the source code
automatically by annotating cryptographic interfaces.
Additionally, we are implementing automatic synthesis of
partitioned security protocols for different target platforms,
e.g. the Genode OS framework [16], including the system
structure, communication policy and instantiated primitives.
Even though implementations for common primitives will be
provided, reusing source code from model extraction during
system synthesis will be investigated further. The proposed
extensions will reduce user interaction to manually annotating
Env primitives.
A mostly automatic partitioning process opens an opportu-
nity to study other and more complex security protocols.
The widespread TLS protocol is an obvious and worthwhile
candidate, as are modern widely adopted secure messaging
protocols like Signal [26] or OMEMO [33].
VI. SUMMARY & CONCLUSION
Partitioning security protocols into component-based imple-
mentations with a minimal TCB facilitates code review and
verification. Traditionally this has been done in a manual ad-
hoc manner which is costly and error-prone. Existing software
partitioning tools are too imprecise, yield a large TCB and
often require unsafe manual steps.
We present a systematic approach to automatically partition
security protocols. Our method models them as primitives
9connected by channels and derives required security guar-
antees using a constraint solver. A number of performance
optimizations help to trade-off between IPC overhead and TCB
size without sacrificing soundness.
We conclude that a methodology for automatically partitioning
cryptographic protocols into component-based systems is an
important step towards trustworthy systems. Our results indi-
cate that an automation is desirable and feasible for real world
protocols.
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